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Earnings and Income Volatility in America:  
Evidence from Matched CPS  
 
 
 
Abstract:  In this paper we offer new evidence on earnings and income volatility in the United 
States over the past four decades by using matched data from the March Current Population 
Survey.  We find that between 1973 and 2008 family income volatility rose by 38 percent, 
primarily as a result of higher volatility of husbands earnings and non means-tested nonlabor 
income.  Rising family income volatility is in evidence across race, education, and family 
structure, and after declining sharply while young, it is increasing in the latter part of the life 
cycle among the skilled.  The Federal tax and transfer system dampens the magnitude of 
volatility in any given year, but not the trends.  Nonparametric tests of structural change indicate 
that overall family income volatility peaked in 1999, with the 2000s characterized by greater 
short-term volatility rather than a continued secular increase.  Most of the increase in family 
earnings volatility occurred prior to the 1990s, which coincides with the trend volatility of male 
earnings.  The earnings volatility of women fell dramatically through the early 1980s, and the 
ongoing secular decline implies male and female earnings volatility is converging. A variance 
decomposition suggests that the trends in earning volatility are driven both by increases in the 
conditional variance of earnings of continuous workers as well as the variance of the conditional 
mean of those workers exiting the labor force.  
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 There is ongoing debate in economics on whether and to what extent the volatility of 
earnings and incomes have increased in the United States in recent decades (Gottschalk and 
Moffitt 1994, 2009; Dynarski and Gruber 1997; Haider 2001; Kniesner and Ziliak 2002a,b; 
Gundersen and Ziliak 2003; Dahl, DeLeire, and Schwabish 2008; Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel 
2008; Hacker and Jacobs 2008; Jensen and Shore 2008; Keys 2008; Shin and Solon 2008; 
Winship 2009).  Documenting trends in volatility is important for a  host of reasons, not least of 
which is a better understanding of the rise in income inequality since the mid 1970s (Katz and 
Autor 1999; Piketty and Saez 2003; Lemieux 2006; Autor, Kearney, and Katz 2008).  Higher 
inequality could be due to a rise in overall earnings and income instability, a shift in permanent 
incomes, or both (Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994; Haider 2001).  However, if there is little 
corroborative evidence of a rise in instability then widening inequality is the likely outcome of 
lifetime changes in the distribution of earnings and income, the latter of which could have 
negative consequences for long-term economic mobility (Gottschalk and Moffitt 2009).  
Whereas the preponderance of evidence on inequality in the United States is based on cross-
section data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), with few exceptions the evidence on 
earnings and income volatility comes almost exclusively from longitudinal data in the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (Gittleman and Joyce 1996; Cameron and Tracy 1998; Dahl, et al. 
2008).  In this paper we offer new evidence on earnings and income volatility over the past four 
decades by exploiting the longitudinal dimension of the CPS to match individuals across surveys. 
The use of the PSID for estimates of volatility owes in part to the literature’s early 
emphasis on decomposing volatility into its permanent and transitory components (Gottschalk 
and Moffitt 1994).  This decomposition is illustrative because it permits identification of 
temporary deviations of earnings from long-term trends, as well as identification of structural 
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changes in long-term trends such as decadal shifts in earnings processes.  This research found 
that transitory earnings instability rose by over 40 percent from the mid 1970s through the mid 
1980s, and then more or less stabilized thereafter, while lifetime inequality rose primarily in the 
1980s (Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994; Haider 2001).  Although much of this research was based 
on samples of prime-age men, Keys (2008) finds that the basic pattern of results hold across race, 
gender, education, and family structure. 
 More recently attention has turned to broader measures of economic volatility, namely 
family and/or household earnings and incomes, rather than individual earnings per se, and in 
some cases to simpler measures of volatility such as the annual percent change. The PSID-based 
papers on family income tend to find a strong increase in volatility in the 30 years from the early 
1970s to the early 2000s, especially in the 1990s, though there is considerable disagreement on 
the magnitude.  The estimates range from a doubling of volatility (Hacker and Jacobs 2008) to as 
low as 10 percent (Winship 2009), with Gundersen and Ziliak (2003), Dynan, et al. (2008), and 
Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009) falling in between with reported increases of 40 to 80 percent.  
Part of the divergence in results emanates from treatment of the PSID redesign in 1992 and 1993, 
and part from the treatment of families reporting zero earnings or income.  Because much of the 
literature reports the variance of log earnings or income, person-years with zero earnings/income 
are dropped from the analysis, which can understate measured volatility because labor-force 
dropouts are ignored.  Dynan et al. (2008) proposed instead to measure volatility as the standard 
deviation of the arc percent change, which admits person-years with zero earnings and/or 
incomes.  Dahl, et al. (2008) adopted a similar measure, but in lieu of the PSID they used 
administrative earnings records from the Social Security Administration’s Continuous Work 
History File merged with longitudinal data in the Survey of Income Program Participation. They 
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found little change in measured earnings and household income volatility after the mid 1980s, 
underscoring that the volatility literature is far from consensus. 
 In this paper we extend research on the evolution of earnings and income volatility in 
several directions. First, we use data from matched CPS files spanning 1973-2009, which makes 
our results more directly informative to the CPS-based inequality research.1  The rotating 
structure of the CPS permits one to match approximately 50 percent of sample respondents in 
one March survey to the March survey the subsequent year.  A second contribution then is with 
two observations for each match we extend the summary measure of volatility used in Dynan, et 
al. (2008) and Dahl, et al. (2008) to be robust not only to those workers transitioning in and out 
of the labor market but also to negative earnings commonly found among the self employed.  
Most of the previous research measures earnings volatility in terms of the growth in log earnings, 
which by construction precludes those with zero or negative earnings. However, there has been 
trend growth in the fraction of the labor force that is self employed, as well as growth in the 
fraction of men out of the labor force and women into the labor force, and our measure captures 
this shifting composition.   
A third contribution is that our use of the CPS  offers much larger sample sizes compared 
to the PSID and thus permits more precision as well as detailed subgroup analyses by race, 
family structure, and cohort. With respect to the latter, we construct 48 five-year date of birth by 
education cohorts that permits us to examine volatility trends over the life cycle. Likewise, an 
advantage of the CPS over the SIPP is that the CPS dates back to the 1960s as opposed to 1984 
                                                 
1 We are aware of two related studies using matched CPS.  Gittleman and Joyce (1996) use matched CPS data to 
estimate earnings mobility and inequality from 1968-1992, focusing on shifts in permanent income differences 
rather than volatility.  Cameron and Tracy (1998) use matched CPS data to examine earnings instability of working 
men, focusing on the permanent/transitory distinctions found in Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994).  Our study differs 
from the latter in several directions, including our examination of income, rather than just earnings, our focus on 
men and women whether working or not, a wide array of family structures, our longer time horizon through the 
2000s, and our formal testing of structural breaks and variance decomposition as described in the text. 
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in the case of the SIPP, and thus we can compare volatility trends in the 1970s directly to those 
found in the PSID.     
 There is much discussion in the volatility literature on if and when the trend in volatility 
changed in recent decades.  In some cases the authors examine the series by decade, and in other 
cases they simply remark on whether and what year the series appears to increase, decrease, or 
stabilize. A fourth contribution of our study is to more formally test for structural breaks in trend 
volatility by employing nonparametric Quandt-Andrews tests of structural change (Quandt 1960; 
Andrews 1993), coupled with confidence intervals around the breakdate (Bai 1997).  The Wald 
tests, which are common to the time-series literature, have not been utilized in the volatility 
literature (or inequality literature more generally) and yet offer the promise of adding precision 
to our understanding of when volatility trends changed, if at all. 
 Since 1970 there have been dramatic changes in the composition of the labor force, and 
this change in composition could have an important effect on earnings and income volatility.  A 
fifth contribution of our project is to exploit the fact that the unconditional variance of earnings 
volatility can be decomposed into the sum of the variance of the conditional mean and the 
conditional variance, and because each of those two terms are a function of whether an 
individual is transitioning into or out of the labor force, or always in or out of work, we can 
examine the relative contributions of changing employment probabilities, variance of conditional 
means, and conditional variances on volatility. 
We find that family income volatility rose by 38 percent over the past four decades, 
driven both by rising volatility of earnings and non means-tested nonlabor income. Rising family 
income volatility is in evidence across race, education, family structure, and the life cycle. Our 
tests of structural change indicate that overall family income volatility peaked in 1999, with the 
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2000s characterized by greater short-term volatility rather than a continued secular increase.  
Most of the 20 percent increase in family earnings volatility occurred prior to the 1990s, which 
coincides with the trend volatility of male earnings.  The earnings volatility of women fell 
dramatically between 1973 and 1983, and with the continued secular decline is converging 
toward levels of men.  The variance decomposition of earnings volatility suggests that the trends 
are driven both by increases in the conditional variance of earnings of continuous workers as 
well as the variance of the conditional mean of those workers exiting the labor force.  
II. Data 
 The data derive from the 1973–2009 waves (1972–2008 calendar years) of the March 
Annual Social and Economic Study of the Current Population Survey (CPS).  The unit of 
observation is an individual between the ages of 16 and 60.  This is intentionally a wider age 
sample than many previous studies that focus on prime-age workers in order to take advantage of 
the survey design of the CPS, which continuously records earnings at the individual level and 
thus fosters an examination of life-cycle profiles of volatility by detailed birth cohort.  The 
rotating design of the CPS means that a respondent is in sample for 4 months, out 8 months, and 
in another 4 months, and this makes it possible to match approximately one-half of the sample 
from one March interview to the next.  Following the recommended procedure we perform an 
initial match of individuals on the basis of five variables—month in sample (months 1-4 for year 
1, months 5-8 for year 2); gender; line number (unique person id); household identifier; 
household number; and state of residence.  We then cross check the initial match on two 
additional criteria: race and age of the individual. If the race of the person changed we delete that 
observation. Also, if the age of the person fell, or if age increased by more than two years (owing 
to the staggered timing of the initial and final interviews), then we delete those observations on 
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the assumption that they were bad matches.  These additional criteria were very important prior 
to the 1986 survey year, but thereafter the five base criteria matched most observations.   
There was a major survey redesign both in the mid 1980s and mid 1990s so it is not 
possible to match across the 1985-1986 waves and the 1995-1996 waves.  In addition, the line 
number, which is intended to uniquely identify a person in the household, was not recorded for 
the 1976-1978 survey years. Thus we do not attempt to match across the 1975-1976 survey 
years, nor is it possible to match across the 1976-1977 years because of changes in the format of 
matching variables.  Thus, we produce an interrupted time series across 36 years with gaps in 
calendar years 1974-1975, 1975-1976, 1984-1985, and 1994-1995. In total we have 640,412 
matches, or roughly 20,000 observations in an average year when a match is possible.  Appendix 
Table 1 lists the number of correct matches across survey years.   
Prior to matching across years, we address two issues with the CPS data.  First, if the 
respondent refuses to supply information on earnings or nonlabor income, then the Census 
Bureau uses a “hotdeck” imputation method to allocate income to those with missing data. 
Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) argue that including allocated data generally leads to an attenuation 
bias on estimated regression coefficients based on imputed data.  Although the implications of 
hot decking for moments of the distribution beyond the mean are not well known, we follow 
Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) and drop those observations with allocated earnings or income.  
Second, in a series of papers, Richard Burkhauser and varied co-authors (Burkhauser, et al. 2004; 
2007; Larrimore, et al. 2008) have raised concerns about trends in income inequality because of 
changes in the way the Census top-codes income data for public release.  Prior to 1995 the 
Census assigned top-coded data a common value (though this value varied across income 
sources, and at times, years), but starting in 1995 they assigned top-coded data the mean values 
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of actual income based on broad demographic groupings (age, race, gender, education).  
Larrimore, et al. (2008) obtained access to internal Census data, which allowed them to back-cast 
the post-1995 procedure to 1976 and thus provide a consistent method of top-coding from 1976 
onwards.  We incorporated their series into our data prior to matching across years. 
 Our primary variables of interest are total labor-market earnings and before-tax income.  
Earnings is defined as the sum of wage and salary income, non-farm self employment, and farm 
self employment. Before-tax income is the same as that used in official Census Bureau 
calculations of poverty and inequality and includes earnings, social insurance payments, means-
tested transfers, and other forms of non-transfer nonlabor income. A more detailed description of 
the construction of income is provided in the Data Appendix.  As described in the results section 
below we also examine volatility omitting self employment earnings and including taxes and in-
kind transfers.  Although we match individuals across years, and present results based on 
individual outcomes, much of the recent literature on volatility has focused on family or 
household earnings and income, and we follow suit.  In the CPS a family is defined as two or 
more persons related by birth, marriage, or adoption and thus family earnings (income) is the 
sum of earnings and income of all related members.  Because each member of the family is 
assigned the same family-level earnings and income, for the family analyses we restrict attention 
to the head of household in order to prevent double counting.  Unless noted otherwise all 
earnings and income data are deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditure Deflator with 
2008 base year.  Basic summary statistics are provided in Appendix Table 2. 
III. Trends in Earnings and Income Volatility 
 We follow Dynan, et al. (2008) and measure volatility as the standard deviation of the arc 
percent change, defined as 
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(1) 100 , 
where  is earnings or income for person i in time t.  Dynan, et al. define the denominator as 
, which is the person-specific time mean across the matched pair of years.  The key 
advantage of this measure over the variance of log earnings used in most of the prior literature is 
that it is defined even if earnings (or income) is zero in one of the two years, and that it is 
symmetric and bounded below by -200 percent and above by +200 percent.2  However, the 
symmetry property is violated if earnings are negative one year, say due to a business loss, and 
positive the next, and this can lead to wild swings in measured volatility based on equation (1).  
As a consequence we modify the arithmetic mean in the denominator as , 
where abs(.) refers to the absolute value.  This modified measure at once permits negative 
earnings and retains the symmetry property of -200 percent and +200 percent.  Because we 
document a rising share of the prime-age male population out of the labor force two years in a 
row in Section 5, we want to retain those individuals with no earnings in either year by setting 
volatility equal to zero. 
[Figure 1 here] 
 We begin in Figure 1 depicting trends in year-to-year family earnings and income 
volatility.3 The first panel of the figure shows that earnings volatility increased sharply through 
the 1970s and into the mid 1980s, rising 20 percent, which corroborates findings from the PSID.  
                                                 
2 We note that it is possible for family income to be zero based on our baseline definition, which does not include in-
kind transfers or income from non-family members.  In an average year about 58 families report zero income, 
though there was a trend increase over the past decade. We examined more closely those families reporting zero 
income, and in a typical year after 1980, 55-60 percent received in-kind support in the form of food stamps, public 
housing, Medicaid, or Medicare, and of the remaining 40 percent, nearly 9 out of 10 report income from non-family 
household members. 
3 Dynan et al. (2008) report 3-year moving averages rather than annual changes owing to smaller samples in the 
PSID.  The large samples in the CPS make smoothing less important, but for completeness we conducted our entire 
analysis with 3-year averages with little change in results. 
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The 1986 redesign of the CPS reset the sample to coincide with the 1980 Decennial Census, 
which initially resulted in a sharp decrease in the level of volatility but not the trend. By the 1996 
redesign, which reset the CPS sample to coincide with the 1990 Census, much of the overall 
increase in family earnings volatility over the 36-year period was realized.  However, the lower 
line in the first panel also shows that family income volatility continued to increase to the end of 
the century, suggesting that although nonlabor income clearly reduced the level of economic 
volatility facing the family, it did not reduce the trend.  In fact, from 1973-2008 family income 
volatility rose 38 percent, almost double that of earnings.  
The series in the first panel of Figure 1 does not adjust for possible changes in family size 
and composition from one period to the next, whether owing to changes in marital status, 
children in the family, or other relational changes.  To account for changing needs in the family 
in the second panel we report the volatility of family earnings to needs and income to needs.  In 
this case needs are determined by the family-size specific poverty threshold, which makes an 
adjustment for economies to scale in family consumption and changes each year according to the 
Consumer Price Index.  Because the threshold is adjusted annually by the CPI, we construct the 
series as the ratio of nominal earnings (or nominal income) to needs. As the second panel 
indicates, adjusting for changing family needs has no discernable impact on volatility trends, and 
thus for the remaining analyses we do not adjust for family size when presenting family or 
household level data.   
Many of the studies in the volatility literature exclude persons with zero or negative 
earnings, although there have been substantial changes in labor force participation of men and 
women in the past four decades.  In Section 5 we provide a more complete accounting of the 
influence of zero earnings to trend volatility, but as a first look at the importance of non-positive 
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earnings or incomes, in the third panel of Figure 1 we reproduce our base-case results excluding 
families reporting negative or no earnings or income in either year.  As all the panels in Figure 1 
are on a common scale, it is readily apparent in comparing panel one to panel three that including 
non-positive values shifts up the level of volatility in any given year by about 10 percentage 
points, but the basic trends reported in the first panel hold, at least with respect to earnings.  
Earnings volatility increases 21 percent in panel three as opposed to 20 percent in panel one, 
most of which is realized by the early 1990s, but family income volatility increases a more 
modest 28 percent with the non-positive values omitted.  
Recent research highlights the consumption-smoothing role of the Federal tax and 
transfer system; that is, the fact that for any given change in before-tax and transfer income, 
after-tax and transfer income changes by less (Gruber 1997; Auerbach and Feenberg 2000; 
Kniesner and Ziliak 2002a,b; Gundersen and Ziliak 2003; Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston 2008).  
Our series already contains the income from major social insurance programs such as 
Unemployment Insurance, Social Security, as well as means-tested cash transfers.  However it 
does not include in-kind transfers such as food stamps or public housing, or income tax payments 
and credits such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  To examine the potential stabilizing 
role of the tax system and fungible in-kind transfers we subtract tax payments from gross income 
and add in the cash value of food stamps, school lunch and breakfast programs, and public 
housing/Section 8.  Tax payments are the sum of Federal, state, and payroll taxes that are 
estimated for each family in each year using the NBER TAXSIM program in conjunction with 
basic information on labor income, taxable nonlabor income, dependents, and certain deductions 
such as property tax payments and child care expenses.4  The Federal and state taxes include the 
                                                 
4 The CPS does not have information on certain inputs to the TAXSIM program such as annual rental payments, 
child care expenses, or other itemized deductions.  We set these values to zero when calculating the tax liability. The 
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respective EITC code for each tax year and state, thus allowing for the possibility of negative tax 
payments after 1975. We assume that the family bears only the employee share of the payroll tax 
rate.  The fourth panel of Figure 1 shows that in any given year the tax system reduces the level 
of volatility by about 10 percent, but does not alter the trend growth.  Indeed the trend growth in 
after-tax income volatility is actually higher at 48 percent than before-tax income volatility. 
When restricting attention to the 1980-2008 survey years when all tax and transfer data are 
available, after-tax volatility increased 43 percent compared to 32 percent for before-tax income.  
These results are consistent with Kniesner and Ziliak (2002a) who found that the tax reforms of 
the 1980s, which reduced the number and magnitude of marginal tax rates, reduced the automatic 
stabilizer capacity of the tax system. 
A. Volatility across Race, Family Structure, and Education 
 In this section we examine whether the trend increase in family earnings and income 
volatility was widely distributed across families based on race, family structure, and education of 
the family head.  In Figure 2 we depict trends in volatility for families headed by a white or a 
black person.  The level and pattern of earnings volatility is strikingly different; although the 
level of earnings volatility is nearly one-third higher among black families, the trend increase in 
overall family earnings volatility in Figure 1 was driven entirely by the 24 percent increase in 
volatility among white families.  There was a strong increase in earnings volatility among black 
families through the mid 1980s, but starting in the early 1990s black family earnings volatility 
fell and the level in 2008 is the same as in 1973.  At the same time, black family income 
volatility actually rose more than white family income volatility (48 versus 36 percent), although 
it is clear that overall income volatility was widely distributed across race. 
                                                                                                                                                             
EITC did not begin until the 1975 tax year, and state taxes were not included in TAXSIM until 1976. In addition, 
food stamps and public housing were not added to the CPS until 1980, and the early-release version of the 2009 CPS 
we use does not include the dollar value of ink-kind transfers. 
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[Figures 2-3 here] 
 With the secular rise of divorce and out of wedlock births, as well as cohabitation, it is 
possible that this has translated into marked differences in volatility across family structure. In 
Figure 3 we present earnings and income volatility for intact families; that is, for families with 
continuous marital status from one year to the next separately for married families (panel one), 
unmarried families (widowed, divorced, separated, never married in panel two), and single 
female-headed families (panel three). Figure 3 reveals that earnings and income volatility is 
lowest for married families as opposed to unmarried heads, or single female headed families, but 
the rise in family earnings volatility occurred primarily among married families.  Earnings 
volatility was essentially constant across the 36 years among unmarried families, while it 
actually fell 15 percent among female heads.  On the other hand, the trend rise in family income 
volatility was experienced across all family types, although the trend rise was least pronounced 
among single female heads of household.  At first blush this may seem surprising given the 
dramatic reforms to the U.S. welfare system in the 1990s, but as noted in Bollinger and Ziliak 
(2008) there were substantial changes in the composition of single mothers toward a much higher 
educated population at the same time that might have dampened the effects of volatility.  
Family income in the CPS does not include the earnings and nonlabor income of 
cohabitors, but their contributions are included in household-level earnings and income, and in 
the last panel of Figure 3 we compare family to household income volatility.  The contributions 
of cohabitors and other non-family members dampens the level of household volatility compared 
to family volatility, as well as the short-term swings in family volatility in the 2000s, but the 
overall trend is unchanged. 
[Figure 4 here] 
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 The vast literature on income inequality seems to be in agreement that the increase in 
wage inequality was most pronounced in the 1980s and was likely due to a combination of skill-
biased technical change favoring skilled workers, falling unionization, and a declining real wage 
(Katz and Autor 1999; Lemieux 2008), while the inequality growth of the 1990s was most 
pronounced in the upper tail of the distribution (Piketty and Saez 2003; Autor, et al. 2008).  The 
developments suggest that the growth in earnings and income volatility should differ across 
education group, and be most pronounced among the least skilled in the first half of the series 
and most pronounced among the high skilled in the second half..  In Figure 4 we depict trends in 
family earnings and income volatility for family heads with less than a high school education, 
those with a high school diploma but not college, and those with some college. The rise in family 
earnings inequality cuts across education level fairly uniformly, increasing by 30 percent for 
dropouts, 30 percent for high school graduates, and 35 percent for those with at least some 
college. However, as predicted earnings volatility rose faster among the less skilled compared to 
high skilled from 1973-1984 (33 versus 12 percent), and then reversed from 1986-2008 (11 
versus 31 percent).  Likewise, total income volatility increased considerably more among high 
school dropouts (70 percent) compared to those with some college (41 percent), but the timing 
followed the earnings pattern.   
B. Volatility across the Life Cycle 
 The timing of volatility over the life cycle can have potentially important welfare 
implications in terms of mobility.  If volatility is largely concentrated early in the life cycle when 
job change is more frequent, either within or across employers, then the welfare consequences 
are likely attenuated relative to a situation where it is increasing with age.  To examine the life 
cycle path of volatility we construct a pseudo panel of individuals along the lines of Deaton 
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(1985) and Blundell et al. (1998) by allocating each individual to one of 48 five-year birth by 
education cohorts, comprised of sixteen birth cohorts and three education groups (less than high 
school, high school graduate, and more than high school). In effect we construct an unbalanced 
panel because many of the cohorts are not present for all ages, but it is possible to look across 
cohorts to identify life cycle profiles of volatility. 
[Figures 5-6 here] 
 In Figure 5 we present the education-group specific life cycle profile of family earnings 
volatility. Each panel contains the time series for sixteen birth cohorts, and in a bid to add 
transparency we overlay a lowess plot that smoothes the data across cohorts using a locally 
weighted regression method.  Figure 5 shows that across education groups volatility declines 
rapidly until about age 35, but among those with high school or more volatility actually begins to 
increase at age 45 and thus is U-shaped across the life cycle.  Figure 6 we present the parallel 
graph of family income volatility across the life cycle.  As with earnings, income volatility 
stabilizes by age 35, but unlike earnings, income volatility is relatively constant thereafter.  One 
reason for the U-shape in earnings volatility might be labor force entry when young and labor-
force exit when old.  In results not graphed we re-drew Figure 5 excluding families with zero 
earnings and indeed the U-shape is attenuated, with earnings volatility being fairly constant 
across the life cycle for less than high school educated heads, and more L-shaped for those with 
12 and more years of schooling akin to total income in Figure 6. 
[Figure 7-8 here] 
 Because it is difficult to identify birth-cohorts in Figures 5-6 owing to the overlapping of 
16 series, in Figures 7-8 we present the time series of family earnings and income volatility by 
each of the 48 education-birth cohorts.  For example, cohort 1 is a family head born between 
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1987 and 1992 who is a high school dropout, cohort 2 is from the same birth years but a high 
school graduate, cohort 3 is also the same birth cohort but with more than high school, cohort 4 
is a high school dropout born between 1982 and 1986, and so on, until cohorts 46-48 who were 
born before 1917.  This figure enables us to identify the full evolution of the life cycle profiles 
and to better understand whether the rising earnings volatility depicted in Figure 1 is driven by 
younger cohorts, older cohorts, or distributed widely across education-birth cohorts. Looking 
across the columns and down the rows of Figures 7-8 it is possible to trace out the U-shape found 
in the previous figures, but at any given age it is not obvious that volatility is concentrated more 
heavily on any one or set of cohorts.  For example, if we focus on cohorts with less than high 
school, cohorts 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 25, and 28 stand out somewhat with higher volatility at age 40, 
but it is subtle.  Rather the rise in volatility in Figure 1 is likely due to the combination of high 
volatility among the young as well as increasing volatility of the old, and with an aging 
workforce the latter is fostering a trend increase in overall volatility.      
C. Earnings and Income Volatility by Source  
 Our analysis to this point has focused on the family as an aggregate unit, and thus in this 
section we want to look within the family to examine the volatility of earnings husbands, wives, 
and other family members at the individual level, as well as the volatility of income by 
component source in addition to earnings. However, to place the volatility of husbands and wives 
in perspective in Figures 9 and 10 we first document trends in earnings volatility overall and by 
race for men and women, respectively.  Figure 9 shows that from 1973 to 2008 earnings 
volatility of men increased about 14 percent overall, with a 16 percent increase for white men 
and no increase for black men, and that much of the increase occurred in the 1970s and early 
1980s.  For example, volatility of black men rose 15 percent from 1973-1984, but fell in the last 
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two decades.  For women in Figure 10, on the other hand, volatility has fallen about 15 percent 
overall in the last four decades, and although most of the decline occurred by the mid 1980s it 
has continued into the 2000s.  Indeed, if the volatility trends of men and women continue the 
levels are likely to converge in the current decade, and in fact this convergence has already taken 
place between black men and women.  
[Figures 9 and 10 here] 
 In Figure 11 we document earnings volatility by status in the family—husbands, wives, 
and others.  The latter category includes single parents (separated, divorced, never married) as 
well as other members of the family other than the head or wife.  The figure, coupled with the 
results in Figure 3 which showed a decline in female-headed earnings volatility and constant for 
unmarried family heads in general, suggests that the overall increase in family earnings volatility 
is being driven primarily by volatility of husbands earnings, and with an added push from family 
members other than the head.  Figure 11 shows that the volatility trends of husbands and wives 
in the last four decades mimics the trends of men and women in general.  
[Figures 11 and 12 here] 
 We return to total income volatility in Figure 12 to examine the rise in volatility by 
income source.  Because of the secular growth in self-employment in the U.S. in recent decades 
in the first panel of Figure 12 we examine the role of self-employment in earnings volatility by 
presenting the time series with and without self employment earnings.  Although self-
employment earnings are volatile from the individual perspective, from the family volatility 
perspective this source actually has the effect of dampening the level of volatility. The panel 
makes clear that self-employment earnings affect the level but not the trends.  The second panel 
depicts trends in income volatility for means-tested transfers and credits (cash welfare, food 
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stamps, housing assistance, SSI, and EITC). As discussed in surveys such as Blank (2002), Hotz 
and Scholz (2003), and Ziliak (2008) there have been dramatic changes in the safety net in the 
U.S. since the 1980s, with huge expansions in cash welfare and food stamps in the early 1990s, 
followed by even larger declines in the late 1990s but with a concomitant increase in the EITC 
and SSI.  However, these changes have had little effect on overall trend inequality for the 
American family, though in results not tabulated means-tested income volatility did increase by 
15 percent for single mother families.  On the other hand, as panels three and four demonstrate, 
there is a strong upward trend in non-welfare nonlabor income since the mid 1980s, which is 
being driven by higher volatility of income from rent payments, interest, and dividends.   
IV. Estimating Trend Breaks in Earnings and Income Volatility 
 Although the family earnings volatility series appears to change in the late 1980s and 
family income volatility about a decade later, it is also important to determine whether the series 
differ in a statistical sense.  In lieu of arbitrarily choosing break points in the volatility series, we 
instead turn to the recent time series literature on testing for structural change with an unknown 
change point (Andrews 1993; Bai 1997; Hansen 2001).  Because these tests have not to our 
knowledge been applied in the volatility or inequality literatures a brief summary of the 
procedure is warranted.  
 The tests build on an idea due to Quandt (1960), who proposed splitting the sample at 
every possible breakdate, estimating the model parameters separately on the two sub samples, 
and constructing the associated Chow test statistic for all possible sample splits (any subsample 
must have more observations than parameters estimated). The estimated breakdate is the sample 
split with the largest value of the Chow test statistic. If the breakdate is known a priori then one 
can appeal to the usual chi-square tables for critical values. However, in many cases the 
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breakdate is not known and the chi-squared critical values are not valid. Andrews (1993) 
developed the asymptotic theory for the case of unknown change point and provided tables of 
critical values, and consequently the new tests are generally known as the Quandt-Andrews sup-
Wald statistic. As noted by Hansen (2001), this method of least squares testing for structural 
change is valid for the linear regression model with homoskedastic variances, and Bai (1997) 
proposed a straightforward method of constructing confidence intervals around the breakdate. 
 To implement the tests we take our estimated univariate time series of volatility and run 
the following regression: 
(2) 10 11 12 1 1
20 21 22 2 2
( ) 85 95 , 1,...,
( ) 85 95 , 1,...,
t y y t t
t y y t t
σ σ σ σ θ ζ τ
σ σ σ σ θ ζ τ
= + + + + =
= + + + + = + T
 
where ( )tσ  is the estimated standard deviation of the percent change,  is a constant 
term (reflecting the constant volatility), 
0 , 1,j jσ = 2
2, 1,j jθ =  is the coefficient on the linear trend t, ζ is an 
iid random error term, τ  is the unknown breakdate, and T = 32 for the calendar years 1973–2008 
(including the 4 missing match years).  The variable y85 is an indicator variable that takes a 
value of 0 before 1985 and 1 thereafter, while y95 takes a value of 0 before 1995 and 1 
thereafter.  These two variables are intended to admit an intercept shift in constant volatility 
associated with the survey redesigns applying to calendar years 1985 and 1995.  For each 
possible breakdate, τ , we conduct the joint test of the null hypothesis of constant volatility, i.e. 
the first set of coefficients equals the second set, by constructing the following Wald test statistic  
(3) ( )1 2 1 2( ( )) / ( ) /( 2pooledW SSE SSE SSE SSE SSE T l= − + + − * )  
where  is the sum of squared errors for the pooled regression with no break,  and 
 are the sum of squared errors for the pre- and post-break periods, respectively, and l is the 
pooledSSE 1SSE
2SSE
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number of parameters in each subsample. The estimated breakdate is the τ̂  with the maximum 
test statistic, , i.e. the supWald statistic.  The associated Bai (1997) confidence interval for Ŵ τ̂  
with trending regressors is ˆ ( 1)ˆ
c
L
τ⎡ ± +⎢⎣ ⎦
⎤
⎥ .  The term c is the critical value for a test of size α  and 
L̂  is the outer product of the fitted valued of the regression standardized by the estimated error 
variance, 2
ˆ 'ˆ
ˆ
ZZL
ˆγ γ
σ
′ ′
]= , with ˆˆ ˆ[ ,j jγ σ θ=  and [1, 85, 95, ]Z y y t=  and where t is set at the 
estimated breakdate τ̂   (See Bai (p. 555) for additional details). 
 In Table 1 we report the Quandt-Andrews supWald test statistics for earnings volatility, 
along with the estimated breakdate, and the associated 95 percent confidence interval. Our tests 
contain four variables—a constant term, trend, and the two indicator variables, which reflects the 
fact that by construction the tests allow for structural change in the coefficients of all included 
regressors. The corresponding critical values for the 4l =  case are 13.82, 15.84, and 20.24 for 
the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels of significance, respectively (Andrews 1993).  
Because the determinants of earnings, and thus earnings volatility, are affected by the business 
cycle (Solon, et al. 1994; Ziliak, et al. 1999), we also conduct our Quandt-Andrews tests 
controlling for the aggregate unemployment rate and report those results in Table 2.  The 
corresponding critical values when unemployment is included are 15.63, 17.88, and 21.90, 
respectively.5 
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 In the first row of Table 1 the supWald statistic of 32.3 clearly rejects at the 1 percent 
level the null hypothesis of no structural change for family earnings.  As initially indicated in 
                                                 
5 In choosing asymptotic critical values there are three parameters of interest, the size of the test, the number of 
parameters, and the date change parameter that lies on the unit interval.  Andrews (1993) recommends restricting the 
date change interval to [0.15, 0.85] when there is no information on the possible structural break date.  We chose 
0.20 for our critical values. 
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Figure 1 where it appeared the break date occurred before the 1990s, the Quandt-Andrews test 
suggests a breakdate in 1992, plus or minus four years.  The somewhat wide confidence interval 
is not too surprising given how the series gradually plateaus from the late 1980s to mid 1990s.  
The last column indicates that the coefficient on the linear trend is positive and statistically 
significant, but it is statistically zero after the break.  This result is robust to the inclusion of the 
unemployment rate in Table 2.  When broken down by race the breakdate for white families is 
pushed back to 2001, and to 1997 for black families when controlling for unemployment. 
Interestingly, the 1992 breakdate in family earnings appears to be a weighted average across 
education levels of the family head, with the break toward higher volatility occurring for high 
school graduates in 1980, and in the 1990s for dropouts and those with at least some college. 
Table 2 shows, however, the differential influence of the business cycle on family volatility as 
the breakdate for graduates rises to 1992, albeit with a very wide confidence interval. Whether 
controlling for the business cycle or not there are marked differences in the structural break point 
between whites and blacks within gender, but controlling for the cycle in Table 2 leads to similar 
breakdates across gender overall, and within racial groups.  White men and women have an 
earnings breakdate in 1979, though the trends are declining for women and rising for men, but 
for both black men and women the early 1990s trend break is toward lower volatility.     
[Tables 3 and 4 here] 
 In Tables 3 and 4 we present the structural break test results for income volatility, with 
and without controls for the business cycle.  Consistent with our priors based on Figure 1, family 
income volatility increases until 1999 before stabilizing.  The 5-year confidence interval around 
the breakdate appears to be due in part to the heterogeneity in breakdates across race, education, 
family structure, and income source. For example, the trend toward higher volatility among 
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female headed families and black families is traced back to the late 1970s.  Collectively the 
Quandt-Andrews tests of structural change on matched CPS data broadly coincide with the 
consensus findings from studies using the PSID that most of the increase in earnings volatility in 
the U.S. took place in the 1970s and 1980s, and that income volatility continued through the 
1990s, but the tests are also at odds with the conclusion from Dahl, et al. (2008) who found in 
SIPP data matched to administrative earnings records that overall income volatility was little 
changed from the 1980s. 
V. Decomposing the Volatility of Earnings 
With the influx of large numbers of women into the labor force in recent decades, 
coupled with labor-force withdrawal of men, the increase in family earnings volatility may be 
due to a compositional change of the workforce, or it may simply reflect increased earnings 
dispersion of workers (Lemieux 2006).  That is, the volatility of earnings depends on the relative 
role of changes in the extensive margin of entry and exit into employment and the intensive 
margin of earnings conditional on being a worker.  Because we define volatility as the variance 
of the percent change from one period to the next, there are four possible states of labor-force 
participation: (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), and (1,1), where 0 means out of the labor force and 1 means 
participation.  In Figure 13 we depict trends in employment rates for men and women, and 
husbands and wives, for each of the four states, and where employment refers to earnings at any 
point in time during the past year.  The figure reveals that among men there is a secular trend 
increase in the (0,0) state, and trend decrease in the (1,1) case, but relatively constant and 
symmetric transition employment rates.  These trends hold for husbands as well, though they are 
less distinct.  For women, on the other hand, the trend increase in the (1,1) state, and concomitant 
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decrease in (0,0), plateaued in the mid 1990s and actually reversed slightly in the 2000s.  This 
was true for wives as well. 
[Figure 13 here] 
 To see the possible interaction between the extensive and intensive margins on the 
uncond l a at we can write the variance as  itiona  volatility of e rnings note th
(4)  | | , 
where q is the arc percent change in earnings,  is an indicator variable equal to one if an 
individual participates in the labor force, and E is the expectations operator.  Equation (4), which 
expresses volatility as the unconditional variance of the percent change of earnings instead of the 
standard deviation, is the sum of the expected conditional variance of the percent change and the 
variance of the conditional mean of the percent change.  
P
With four possible states of labor-force participation, this implies that the first term on 
the righ  t hand side of equation (4) can be expressed as 
(5) | | 0,0 Pr 0,0 | 0,1 Pr 0,1
| 1,0 Pr 1,0 | 1,1 Pr 1,1 . 
However, the volatility of nonworkers is zero, and thus the first term of (5) is zero.  Also, 
because the arc percent change from equation (1) equals 200 for all workers in the (0,1) state, 
and equals -200 for all workers in the (1,0) state, this means the variance of these two 
subsamples are also zero since the percent change is a constant.  Consequently, the only term 
remaining in (5) is the fourth term, which is the volatility of two-period workers weighted by the 
probability of working both periods.  
 Likewise, we can express the variance of the conditional mean in equation (4) as follows 
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(6)  | | 0,0 Pr 0,0  | 0,1
Pr 0,1  | 1,0 Pr 1,0  | 1,1
Pr 1,1 ,  
where | 0,0 0, i.e. the conditional mean of two-period non-workers is zero.  This 
implies that the unconditional variance in (4) is a function of five terms—the weighted 
conditional variance in equation (5) plus the four weighted variances of the conditional mean in 
two-period non-workers, the two transition states, and two-period workers from (6).   
[Figures 14-20 here] 
In Figures 14-20 we depict the time series of each of the five components in the volatility 
variance decomposition for family earnings, husbands, wives, white men, black men, white 
women, and black women.  In the top panel of each figure we depict the conditional variance of 
two-period workers from equation (5) on the right axis and on the left axis we present the 
variance of the conditional mean for the two transition states (0,1) and (1,0).  Because the scales 
are markedly different the trends for the conditional mean variances for the two period work 
(1,1) and non-work (0,0) states are in the bottom panel.  Across all samples the contribution of 
the variances of the conditional means from the continuous work and non-work states to overall 
volatility is negligible, and thus we restrict attention to the top panels.  At the family level in 
Figure 14 most volatility comes from the conditional variance, though after the mid 1990s the 
contribution of the conditional mean variance of families transitioning from work to non-work 
(1,0) increases.  Thus even though the probability of such a transition is small, and stable over 
the period, the contribution to volatility is not.  The trends affecting the family track strongly 
those of husbands in Figure 15.  In Figure 16 for wives, however, in the early part of the sample 
volatility is dominated by labor-force transitions, both (0,1) and (1,0), but as volatility of wives 
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earnings declined over time the three variance terms in the top panel were roughly equal in 
magnitude.  At the individual level, among white men in Figure 17, the conditional variance 
dominates the variance of the conditional mean in any given year, though clearly in the past 
decade the conditional mean variance of exiters increases as the conditional variance of 
continuous workers declines.  For black men in Figure 18, and white and black women in 
Figures 19 and 20, respectively, the last four decades are characterized by a declining 
contribution of the variance of the conditional mean of labor-force transitions such that by the 
2000s the three terms were roughly each in magnitude. 
VI. Conclusion 
We found strong evidence from matched data from the CPS that income volatility 
increased substantially from the 1970s through the 1990s, and that this increase was distributed 
widely across the American family in terms of race, education, and family structure.  The 
primary source of rising income volatility was an increase in earnings volatility of men and an 
increase in non-transfer nonlabor income volatility, especially income from rent, interest, and 
dividends.  Although much of the rise in earnings volatility stems from higher conditional 
variance of earnings among continuous workers, an increasing fraction comes from higher 
variance of the conditional mean among workers exiting the labor force from one period to the 
next.  With the aging of the labor force these trends are likely to continue to exert upward 
pressure on volatility overall.    
Our results broadly corroborate those from studies based on the PSID, namely that most 
of the increase in earnings volatility occurred prior to the 1990s but that income volatility 
continued to rise through the 1990s.  With the change to every other year survey design after 
1997, Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009) urge caution in interpreting volatility trends from the PSID 
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in the 2000s.  This makes data from matched CPS a potentially more appealing source for future 
research on this topic. Along these lines, our cohort analysis indicates that earnings volatility is 
U-shaped across the life cycle, especially for skilled workers.  Future research should examine in 
more detail life cycle patterns of volatility, especially the role of labor-force exits.  Related, with 
broad trends now established across several major survey and administrative data sets new 
research is needed on underlying causal factors such as whether the labor force transitions 
leading to higher volatility are voluntary or involuntary, as well as to research on the effects of 
volatility on family and child well being. 
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Data Appendix 
 
Earnings is the sum of wage and salary income, non-farm self employment, and farm self 
employment. Individual earnings before 1977 are calculated using the sum of income from 
wages, self employment income, and farm income.  For 1977 and beyond the CPS has its own 
composite definition of individual earnings that incorporates the same components we use before 
1977.   
Income is includes earnings, Social Security (retirement, disability, and survivors 
benefits), Supplemental Security Income, Unemployment Insurance, workers’ compensation, 
AFDC/TANF and other forms of public cash welfare, veterans’ payments, pension income, 
rent/interest/dividend income, royalties, income from estates, trusts, educational assistance, 
alimony, child support, assistance from outside the household, and other income sources. Data 
on AFDC/TANF cash assistance, social security payments, and social security disability 
payments are available in the CPS after 1974; the monetary value of food stamps, earned income 
tax credits, and housing subsidies do not become available in the CPS until 1979.  This means 
that our income category for “Means Tested Transfers and Credits” excludes these variables 
before 1979.  When we decompose “Other Income” into its respective subcategories, note that 
the CPS combines two distinct variables, (1) alimony and (2) child support, to create “Alimony 
and Child Support” between 1975 and 1986.  After 1986 alimony and child support are separate 
variables that we combine to create a uniform measure across the panel.  The income categories 
“Unemployment (UI), Worker’s Compensation (WC), and Veteran’s benefits” and “Rent, 
Interest, and Dividends” are structured similarly, so that each of the three distinct subcategories 
are combined after 1986 to create one variable for use across the panel.   As with “Alimony and 
Child Support”, these last two categories’ components were combined in the CPS prior to 1987.   
 
Appendix Table 1: Number of Merges Per Year by 2nd Year of CPS Panel  
Calendar Year 1973-2008 
Year Number of Merges 
1973 10,116 
1974 14618 
1975 - 
1976 - 
1977 26,063 
1978 23,661 
1979 21,800 
1980 23,421 
1981 21,404 
1982 23,379 
1983 23,303 
1984 21,313 
1985 - 
1986 19,129 
1987 21,114 
1988 22,436 
1989 22,810 
1990 24,330 
1991 24,131 
1992 23,792 
1993 22,580 
1994 19,883 
1995 - 
1996 18,462 
1997 18,140 
1998 16,976 
1999 16,223 
2000 15,449 
2001 18,538 
2002 18,161 
2003 19,085 
2004 16,260 
2005 17,470 
2006 18,431 
2007 18,873 
2008 19,061 
Average Number of Matches  20,013     
 
Appendix Table 2. Summary Statistics by 2nd Year Adjusted for Inflation (2008 Dollars) 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
 
Earnings and Income 
 
   Family Earnings ($) 
   % Change in Family Earnings 
   Family Income ($) 
   % Change in Family Income 
   Disposable Income ($) 
   Self Employment Income ($) 
 
Demographics 
 
   Age 
   % Female 
   No. of Persons in Family 
   % Less Than High School  
   % High School 
   % More Than High School 
   % White 
   % Black 
   % Other 
   % Married 
 
 
 
 
62,709.95 
0.65 
69,280.60 
1.82 
52,561.31 
3,489.32 
 
 
 
37.63 
53.53 
3.28 
20.37 
35.55 
44.08 
86.07 
9.50 
4.42 
62.70
 
 
 
53,678.91 
107.19 
55,925.64 
190.83 
35,583.78 
18,142.65 
 
 
 
12.21 
49.87 
1.49 
39.82 
47.60 
48.73 
34.52 
29.32 
19.96 
48.20
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Figure 3. Family Earnings and Income Volatility
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Figure 4. Family Earnings and Income Volatility
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Figure 5. Earnings Volatility Across the Lifecycle
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Figure 6. Income Volatility Across the Lifecycle
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Figure 7. Earnings Volatility by Education-Birth Cohort
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Figure 8. Income Volatility by Education-Birth Cohort
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Figure 9. Individual Earnings Volatility
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Figure 10. Individual Earnings Volatility
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Figure 11. Individual Earnings Volatility
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Figure 12. Income Volatility By Source of Income
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Figure 13. Mean Employment Rate by Entry and Exit Status
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Figure 14. Variance Decomposition of Family Earnings
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Figure 15. Variance Decomposition of Husband Earnings
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Figure 16. Variance Decomposition of Wife Earnings
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Figure 17. Variance Decomposition of White Male Earnings
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Figure 18. Variance Decomposition of Black Male Earnings
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Figure 19. Variance Decomposition of White Female Earnings
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Figure 20. Variance Decomposition of Black Female Earnings
  
 
Table 1: Quandt-Andrews Tests of Structural Change in Earnings Volatility 
Series 
supWald 
Statistic Break Year 
CI-width 
(Years) 
 
Sign of Trend 
Coefficient 
(pre-break, 
post-break) 
 
Family Earnings 
 
White Families 
Black Families 
 
Less than H.S. 
H.S. 
More than H.S.  
 
Married Heads 
Single Heads 
 
Female Heads 
 
Men 
White Men 
Black Men 
 
Women 
White Women 
Black Women 
 
Husbands 
Wives 
Not Husbands or Wives 
 
Earnings without Self 
Employment Income 
 
32.26*** 
 
28.99*** 
20.37*** 
 
21.74*** 
18.45** 
22.97*** 
 
24.61*** 
11.31 
 
8.12 
 
13.99* 
10.79 
26.77*** 
 
34.78*** 
28.23*** 
15.77* 
 
26.75*** 
8.11 
19.93** 
 
48.32*** 
 
1992 
 
2001 
1992 
 
1996 
1980 
1993 
 
2001 
1992 
 
1990 
 
2002 
2003 
1991 
 
1979 
1979 
1992 
 
1981 
2000 
1979 
 
1988 
 
+/- 4 
 
--- 
+/- 4 
 
+/- 5 
+/- 2 
+/- 4 
 
+/- 8 
+/- 3 
 
+/- 4 
 
--- 
--- 
+/- 3 
 
+/- 1 
+/- 1 
+/- 1 
 
+/- 1 
+/- 2 
+/- 2 
 
--- 
 
+/0 
 
+/0 
+/- 
 
+/0 
0/+ 
+/+ 
 
+/0 
0/- 
 
0/- 
 
+/- 
+/0 
+/- 
 
+/- 
+/- 
-/- 
 
0/+ 
-/- 
+/0 
 
+/0 
Note: The 0 in the last column indicates that the coefficient on the trend variable is statistically 
zero at least at the 10% level. For the Wald statistics *** = reject at the 1% level; ** = reject at 
the 5% level; *=reject at the 10% level. --- refers to a confidence interval that lies out of sample. 
 
  
  
 
 
Table 2: Quandt-Andrews Tests of Structural Change in Earnings Volatility  
Controlling for Unemployment 
Series 
supWald 
Statistic Break Year 
CI-width 
(Years) 
 
Sign of Trend 
Coefficient 
(pre-break, 
post-break) 
 
Family Earnings 
 
White Families 
Black Families 
 
Less than H.S. 
H.S. 
More than H.S.  
 
Married Heads 
Single Heads 
 
Female Heads 
 
Men 
White Men 
Black Men 
 
Women 
White Women 
Black Women 
 
Husbands 
Wives 
Not Husbands or Wives 
 
Earnings without Self 
Employment Income 
 
23.78*** 
 
23.17*** 
21.54*** 
 
25.48*** 
15.59* 
17.93** 
 
22.20*** 
12.40 
 
7.70 
 
14.50 
18.58** 
24.73*** 
 
25.02*** 
20.18** 
13.87 
 
16.96* 
12.29 
18.74** 
 
37.45*** 
 
1992 
 
2001 
1997 
 
1996 
1992 
2000 
 
2001 
1992 
 
1986 
 
1979 
1979 
1991 
 
1979 
1979 
1992 
 
1999 
2000 
1979 
 
1989 
 
+/- 4 
 
+/- 4 
--- 
 
+/- 2 
+/- 15 
+/- 4 
 
+/- 3 
+/- 2 
 
+/- 2 
 
+/- 1 
+/- 1 
+/- 3 
 
+/- 1 
+/- 1 
+/- 2 
 
+/- 2 
+/- 4 
+/- 1 
 
--- 
 
+/0 
 
+/0 
+/- 
 
+/0 
+/+ 
+/0 
 
+/0 
0/- 
 
0/- 
 
+/+ 
+/+ 
+/- 
 
 +/- 
0/- 
0/- 
 
+/- 
0/- 
0/0 
 
+/0 
Note: The 0 in the last column indicates that the coefficient on the trend variable is statistically 
zero at least at the 10% level. For the Wald statistics *** = reject at the 1% level; ** = reject at 
the 5% level; *=reject at the 10% level. --- refers to a confidence interval that lies out of sample. 
 
 
 
  
Table 3: Quandt-Andrews Tests of Structural Change in Income Volatility 
Series 
supWald 
Statistic 
Break 
Year 
CI-width 
(Years) 
 
Sign of Trend 
Coefficient 
(pre-break, 
post-break) 
 
Family Income 
 
White Families 
Black Families 
 
Less than H.S. (family) 
H.S. 
More than H.S. 
 
Married (family) 
Single 
 
Female Head (family) 
 
Household 
 
Means Tested Income (1980-) 
 
Other Income (1977-) 
 
 
17.77** 
 
16.69** 
13.21 
 
17.35** 
12.43 
12.48 
 
17.16** 
8.11 
 
14.52* 
 
15.51* 
 
11.13 
 
21.78*** 
 
 
1999 
 
1999 
1979 
 
2000 
2003 
1993 
 
1999 
1978 
 
1978 
 
1981 
 
1997 
 
1986 
 
 
+/- 5 
 
+/- 3 
+/- 2 
 
+/- 3 
--- 
+/- 2 
 
+/- 4 
+/- 4 
 
+/- 2 
 
+/- 2 
 
+/- 2 
 
+/- 1 
 
 
+/0 
 
+/0 
0/+ 
 
+/0 
+/0 
+/+ 
 
+/- 
0/+ 
 
0/+ 
 
0/+ 
 
0/- 
 
-/+ 
 
Note: The 0 in the last column indicates that the coefficient on the trend variable is statistically 
zero at least at the 10% level. For the Wald statistics *** = reject at the 1% level; ** = reject at 
the 5% level; *=reject at the 10% level. --- refers to a confidence interval that lies out of sample. 
 
  
  
 
 
Table 4: Quandt-Andrews Tests of Structural Change in Income Volatility  
Controlling for Unemployment 
Series 
supWald 
Statistic 
Break 
Year 
CI-width 
(Years) 
 
Sign of Trend 
Coefficient 
(pre-break, 
post-break) 
 
Family Income 
 
White Families 
Black Families 
 
Less than H.S. (family) 
H.S. 
More than H.S. 
 
Married (family) 
Single 
 
Female Head (family) 
 
Household 
 
Means Tested Income (1980-) 
 
Other Income (1977-) 
 
 
16.79* 
 
17.31* 
10.00 
 
14.31 
11.19 
13.99 
 
22.85*** 
10.60 
 
21.21** 
 
14.30 
 
9.91 
 
17.16* 
 
 
1999 
 
1999 
1979 
 
2000 
1999 
2001 
 
2001 
1979 
 
1979 
 
1981 
 
1997 
 
1986 
 
+/- 4 
 
+/- 3 
+/- 3 
 
+/- 3 
+/- 8 
+/- 6 
 
+/- 3 
--- 
 
+/- 7 
 
+/- 1 
 
+/- 2 
 
+/- 1 
 
 
+/0 
 
+/0 
0/+ 
 
+/0 
+/0 
+/0 
 
+/0 
0/+ 
 
0/+ 
 
0/+ 
 
0/- 
 
0/+ 
 
Note: The 0 in the last column indicates that the coefficient on the trend variable is statistically 
zero at least at the 10% level. For the Wald statistics *** = reject at the 1% level; ** = reject at 
the 5% level; *=reject at the 10% level. --- refers to a confidence interval that lies out of sample. 
 
 
 
